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Dan Garnaas-Holmes 
 
 JUDICIAL REVIEW: FOSTERING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND RULE OF LAW 
 
 This paper investigates the relationship between judicial review and the rule of law. I 
begin with the assumption that rule of law constitutes an integral aspect of a sustainable and 
robust government designed to serve the people of a nation. By rule of law, I mean that society is 
governed by rule-based decision making rather than arbitrary deference to judges or 
administrative agencies.1 Thus “every application of public power must follow the legal rules 
accepted by the people who are destined to be affected by the exercise of that power.”2 Working 
from that assumption, it would seem that to have rule of law, judges must be allowed to 
independently interpret and apply laws in accordance with society’s values. Working from this 
foundation I explore how countries have developed judicial review and what circumstances 
foster its growth and development. 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN CIVIL AND COMMON LAW SYSTEMS 
 Judicial review entails “review of an inferior legal norm for conformity with a higher 
one.”3 That higher norm is often embodied in a constitution. In Marbury v. Madision, Justice 
Marshall describes a hierarchy of laws, the U.S. Constitution being the supreme law of the land, 
which the Supreme Court is required to interpret and apply.4 With his opinion in Marbury, 
Justice Marshall set the foundation for one of the most robust systems of judicial review in the 
modern world.  
 Judicial review, however, has been much slower to develop in civil law countries. This 
difference in evolution is largely attributable to the civil law system’s distrust of the judiciary, 
                                                 
1 See José María Maravall & Adam Przeworksi, Introduction, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 1 (José María 
Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003). 
2 Rainer Arnold, Constitutional Courts of Central and Eastern European Countries as a Dynamic Source of Modern 
Legal Ideas, 18 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 99, 100 (2003). 
3 See Edith Z. Friedler, Judicial Review in Chile, 7 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 321, 323 (2000). 
4 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Robert F. Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, Judicial Review in the New 
Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts from a Comparative Perspective, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 559, 579 
(1993) (describing hierarchy of laws).
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particularly in France following the French Revolution.5 Historically, French courts vigorously 
exercised judicial review to ensure all laws were in conformity with the “fundamental laws of the 
realm.”6 This essentially ensured continued monarchical control of all legal matters and 
developments.7 Following the Revolution, however, judicial power to review and alter decisions 
of the democratically elected legislature was seen as perversely conservative and 
countermajoritarian.8 Thus, the civil law tradition emerged as one in which comprehensive codes 
enacted by the legislature represent the ultimate source and authority of law, law which a judge 
is required to technically apply rather than interpret. If ever the judiciary was doubtful as to 
statutory interpretation, the question would be certified to the legislature (référé législatif) rather 
than risk undemocratic judicial interpretation. Such parliamentary supremacy renders it unlikely 
that judicial review similar to that exercised in common law systems will develop. 
 The robust judicial review found in common law systems is attributable to the great 
deference traditionally afforded judges within a context of strict separation of powers.9 The 
defining aspect of common law systems is the role judges play in shaping and reforming the law; 
it has long been acceptable for judges to redefine common law crimes and civil norms. It is thus 
unsurprising that society readily accepts an independent judiciary situated to review legislative 
acts and ensure their conformity with higher legal principles. The fact that any principle can be 
“higher” as compared to another implies that some hierarchy of laws persists within the system. 
                                                 
5 See Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 4, at 563-71. 
6 See id. at 565-66. 
7 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 2-6 (1971). 
8 This is not a debate endemic to civil law systems, however, and prevails even in common law literature within the 
United States. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 16-26 (1662) (arguing judicial 
review is necessary, but also countermajoritarian); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998) (arguing in response to Bickel that judicial review is not countermajoritarian, but is 
rather particularly democratic in serving the end of individual liberty); see also TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 104-08 (2003). 
9 Of interesting note, judicial review is essentially nonexistent in Great Britain, the mother of all common law 
systems. This, coupled with a lack of strong constitutional demands separates Great Britain as an anomaly. See Utter 
& Lundsgaard, supra note 4, at 577-78 (noting Glorious Revolution of 1688 and parliamentary supremacy must be 
seen in light of a strong “rule of law” tradition). 
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Unlike in civil law systems, such legal hierarchies have long existed in common law systems, 
thus necessitating some form of review to ensure compliance with those principles.10
 Recently, the civil and common law systems have begun to converge. Following World 
War II, many civil law countries realized the fallibility of legislatures and the dangers inherent in 
granting any one branch supreme power.11 The European experience with fascism led to 
renewed reform efforts in favor of principled rule by the people. The ensuing atmosphere of 
transformation led to changes such as Germany’s establishment of a Constitutional Court, 
expanded jurisdiction for the French Council of State, and the waning influence of legal 
positivism within Europe. In common law systems, however, the general trend is toward a more 
extensively codified legal system.12 Although still permitting judicial interpretation, codification 
significantly restrains judicial discretion. Given the increasing relevance and importance of 
judicial review in civil law countries and its role in rule of law, I explore what circumstances will 
foment and encourage the development of sustainable judicial review in civil law systems. 
II. LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT 
 While Latin American civil law systems retain notions of legislative supremacy, the 
notion of Cuadillo leadership, or presidentialism, is a concept unique to Latin America. Many 
countries are organized through political pyramids from which patronage, wealth, power and 
programs flow.13 At the apex of that pyramid is the national government, controlled by the 
president. This legal and political culture has resulted in substantial investment of power with the 
executive. While immediately suspect to an American observer believing in strict separation of 
powers and equal balance between them, presidentialism stems from an alternative notion of the 
                                                 
10 See id. at 579. 
11 See id. at 570; JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 
707 (1994). 
12 See Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 4, at 581. 
13 See Merryman, supra note 11, at 604. 
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State’s role in society, termed “paternalism.” The State’s role is to care and provide for its 
people, and as the head of the State, the executive controls that endeavor. Because executives are 
seen as providers—heads of the national family—society is more deferential to executive power. 
The judicial branch, as in most civil law systems, simply applies and enforces the law 
rather than acting as an independent branch. In Latin America, the tension over judicial review 
exists between courts and the executive, rather than courts and legislature, as in most other civil 
law systems.14 The expansive power granted the executive has often included that to declare a 
“state of emergency” during which legislative rules and their judicial application can be 
suspended indefinitely.15 Thus, even though Latin American constitutions contain extensive 
human rights provisions and U.S. influence has led to the creation of judicial systems with the 
theoretical power to review legislative and executive actions, the centralized presidentialism 
predominant in much of Latin America has, until recently, led to a muted role for most 
judiciaries. 
III. HYPOTHESIS 
 Given the parliamentary supremacy in civil law systems, I began with the assumption that 
judicial review would be more effective and better accepted if it entailed review of those actions 
that society felt less need to vest in representative branches. In traditional civil law systems, this 
would be administrative actions. Once judicial review proves effective and innocuous in that 
context, it will find less resistance in expanding to review of legislative actions as well. Because 
of the added notion of Cuadillo leadership in Latin American civil law systems, however, 
judicial review in such systems would lag behind that in European civil law systems because it 
would not only be difficult for judiciaries to assert review over legislative actions, but also 
administrative actions.  
                                                 
14 See Richard J. Wilson, Reflections on Judicial Review in Latin America, 7 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 435, 441 (2000). 
15 See id. 
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In exploring this idea I compare Chile and Poland, which are both similar in many 
respects: both embody a civil law system; both endured oppressive rule under autocratic 
governments; both have experienced renewed economic growth through neo-liberal, market-
driven economic policies; and both have recently emerged as democratic states. Their similarities 
make them apt for comparison in their experience with judicial review. This project analyzes 
their constitutions, jurisprudence, and commentary in scholarly literature in order to ascertain the 
nature of judicial review in each respective state. 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN CHILE 
 Chile’s 1925 Constitution contained provisions granting the Supreme Court the power to 
conduct judicial review. The previous constitution embodied the French notion of absolute 
legislative supremacy and required Congress, rather than courts, to resolve doubts as to the 
meaning of constitutional provisions. Unlike the majority of civil law countries, Chile refused to 
adopt an Austrian model of judicial review.16 Admittedly, U.S. influence in Latin America 
played a substantial role in this departure. The drafters of the Constitution also felt the Austrian 
model of centralized review would grant the judiciary power above that of the legislature and 
executive, thus transforming it into a super-legislature able to assume substantial power.17 Yet 
Chile was unwilling to adopt the more diffuse system of judicial review as found in many 
common law systems, in which the constituent pieces of the ordinary judicial system conduct 
judicial review.18  Rather, Chile vested the power in a single court, but one within the ordinary 
judicial infrastructure.19  
                                                 
16 The Austrian model is characterized by a centralized system of judicial review in which a single court, separate 
from the ordinary judicial infrastructure, is granted the power to conduct judicial review. See Utter & Lundsgaard, 
supra note 4, at 584. 
17 See Friedler, supra note 3, at 328. 
18 See Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 4, at 583. 
19 To clarify, the same result would be reached if the United States vested judicial review only in the Supreme Court 
and withheld that power from the lower courts. While the Supreme Court would remain an appellate court for the 
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 The power of the court was constrained in that its decisions were only binding inter 
partes, as opposed to erga omnes. Thus the court had to address identical constitutional issues 
multiple times because its holding was only binding on those parties involved in the particular 
suit rather than all those within its jurisdiction. Because the court refrained from exercising its 
new-found power, however, the legislature became increasingly powerful, eventually assuming 
the legislative supremacy common to civil law systems.20 In 1970, Chile further increased the 
role of the judiciary by creating an additional and separate Constitutional Court with the power 
to review compliance of legislation, prior to promulgation, with the Constitution. 
The new court, however, was unable to secure solid footing before Augusto Pinochet’s 
military junta dissolved it after assuming power in 1973. During Pinochet’s tenure as president, 
the Supreme Court remained the sole body entrusted with judicial review. That power was only 
theoretical, as the court refused to intervene in the proceedings of military tribunals and 
essentially proclaimed its adherence to the new regime.21 In 1980, the regime once again altered 
the structure of the judiciary through a new constitution approved by plebiscite. The 1980 
Constitution revived the Constitutional Court and expanded the power of the Supreme Court. In 
1990 Pinochet left office and Chile began the process of re-democratization. 
Modern judicial review in Chile is split between the two courts. The Constitutional Court 
controls review of “organic” and interpretive constitutional laws prior to promulgation as well as 
ordinary laws and bills to amend the constitution.22 Article 82 of the constitution mandates 
review of the former while review of the latter is optional and can only ensue on request of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
ordinary judicial system, it would have the additional and sole responsibility of interpreting and applying 
constitutional law. 
20 See Friedler, supra note 3, at 321. 
21 See id. at 331. 
22 Organic laws being “those specific subjects, not delegable by Congress, the approval, modification, or repeal of 
which requires the vote of four-sevenths of the representatives and senators in office.” Id. at 335. Interpretative laws 
interpret the constitution to clarify ambiguity, but cannot amend the constitution. Id. at 336. 
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President or a Chamber of Congress. To review laws during the legislative process, the court 
may act only at the request of Congress, or another body granted standing to bring the issue 
before the court. In all of its review, the Constitutional Court acts a priori, that is, in the abstract 
without reference to any particular set of facts to guide the analysis. Per Article 83 of the 
constitution, all decisions concerning the constitutionality of a matter before the court are final 
and those laws may not be promulgated. 
The Supreme Court shares with the Constitutional Court the ability to rule on the 
constitutionality of a law, but with some differences.23 Review by the Supreme Court is a 
posteriori (after promulgation) and occurs only within the context of specific cases pending 
before a lower tribunal. The Supreme Court can act either at the request of a party or sua sponte, 
but the ruling is only binding inter partes, as apposed to the Constitutional Court’s power to stop 
promulgation of laws. The combined system has led to confusion and overlap in several areas, 
which has ultimately diluted the effect of judicial review. Although the judicial infrastructure 
appears robust on paper, it continues to face the constraints Pinochet’s regime put in place as 
well as the confusion and overlap of the dual system.24
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN POLAND 
 
 Following World War II, the Soviets instituted a communist government in Poland and, 
in 1952, drafted a new constitution officially proclaiming the People’s Republic of Poland. The 
constitution reflected the traditional civil law notion of vesting superintendence of the 
constitutionality of state actions in Parliament, as opposed to courts.25 Directly following World 
War II, constitutional review in Poland continued until the communist leadership abolished the 
                                                 
23 See id. at 343-44. 
24 See id. at 346; see also Tom Farer, Consolidating Democracy in Latin America: Law, Legal Institutions and 
Constitutional Structure, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1295, 1303 (1995) (arguing inability of Chilean courts to 
prosecute officers of old regime inhibits transformation and faith in judiciary). 
25 See Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki, Judicial Review in Post-Communist Poland: The Emergence of a 
Rechsstaat?, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 13, 16 (1995). 
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practice. During the 1960s and 70s, however, public support for judicial review grew in light of 
reformations taking place throughout Europe. 
 The Communist Party felt it had no choice but to create some form of judicial review to 
placate the public, and created the Council of State. After it became apparent that the newly-
created Council would not use its a priori power to review laws, there were renewed calls for 
creation of an independent body.26 In 1980, the Party again succumbed to public pressure and 
created the High Administrative Court. The Court played an active role in protecting individual 
rights against arbitrary administrative actions.27 After only a year of existence, the multitude of 
violations made clear the need for a more sophisticated system of judicial review, and so began 
the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal). 
 In 1986 the Tribunal began operation with the Communist Party maintaining it was a 
logical extension of communist rule. Although the Tribunal was unique in its nature throughout 
the entire Soviet Bloc, the it ensured its continued operation by avoiding ruling on any politically 
contentious cases, thus depriving the Communist Party of any impetus to intervene. In 1989, 
Poland ratified a new constitution, eliminating the dominant role of the Communist Party.28 Soon 
after, the Tribunal expanded its jurisdiction to allow so called “universal interpretation of laws” 
and review of Parliamentary actions before Presidential ratification. The Tribunal has continued 
to expand its jurisdiction and assume a more active and aggressive role in statutory review, 
including statutes within previously proscribed areas of judicial review. 
 Chapter I, Article 2 of the 1989 Constitution provides that “the Republic of Poland shall 
be a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice.” The court 
used this Rechtsstaat (state ruled by law) Clause to significantly expand its jurisdiction and 
                                                 
26 In ten years of existence, the Council issued only one instruction on the constitutionality of a law. See id. at 20. 
27 See id. at 21. 
28 See Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. Chi. L Rev. 447, 463 (1991). 
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ability to conduct judicial review.29 The court has recognized vested rights of private citizens 
while refusing to recognize such rights for the Communist Party. It has interpreted the Clause to 
imply a principle of equality, expanding that principle to include “social status.” Perhaps most 
notably, in a case invalidating legislation allowing the dismissal of judges, the court read the 
Clause to grant citizens the right to a fair judicial hearing before an independent judiciary.30 
Although judicial review has become far more robust than that within traditional civil law 
systems, some restraints remain, such as the ability of Parliament to overturn Tribunal decisions 
by a two-thirds vote as well as a susceptibility to popular and political pressures.31
VI. EXPLANATION 
 Why has judicial review thrived in Poland yet failed to flourish in Chile? The explanation 
lies in the ‘failure’ of the Communist Party to effectively reign in the judiciary and maintain 
autocratic control of the governmental process. In Chile, Pinochet effectively decapitated the 
judiciary and hamstrung any effort at judicial review. The Supreme Court and Constitutional 
Court met resistance in review of administrative actions because the military regime refused to 
succumb to external examination of its conduct. There was little point in reviewing legislative 
actions as it too was a diminutive actor in light of Pinochet’s grip on the government. It was not 
until 1990 that Chile could even begin transforming its judiciary, and even now it works within 
the confines of a constitution drafted by the military regime designed to retain a form of 
“protected democracy.” 
Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, on the other hand, was able to avoid Communist Party 
interference by reviewing administrative actions in which the Party had no political stake. Once 
                                                 
29 It is thus similar to the United States Supreme Court’s use of substantive due process jurisprudence. 
30 The independence of the judiciary has since been provided for in the 1997 Constitution, Chapter VIII, Article 173 
of which states: the courts and tribunals shall constitute a separate power and shall be independent of other branches. 
31 The court has refused, for example, to confront the Catholic Church and does not consistently challenge 
Parliament. See Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 25, at 46-53. 
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it had its foot in the door, the Tribunal was able to expand its role after the downfall of the Soviet 
Bloc. To some extent, however, the divergence is the practical result of bifurcated judicial 
review in Chile. Much of the abstention from judicial action in Chile results from confusion and 
overlapping jurisdiction, which Poland avoids by vesting judicial review in a single court. 
 There are also external factors influencing Polish judicial reform absent in Chile. One of 
the most celebrated ends of judicial review is the protection of human rights.32 In 2004, Poland 
joined the European Union. As part of its membership, Poland must comply with certain minimal 
assurances of protection for individual rights. Poland’s judiciary is thus able to apply more 
vigorous judicial review and justify its use by citing the need to comply with external 
requirements, thereby reducing criticism that it is attempting to assert super-legislative authority 
for its own political ends. To some extent, Chile is also constrained by an external court, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. That court, however, does not have the same extensive 
power as the European Union to interfere with domestic matters, but rather serves as a body to 
expose corruption and abuses within states. Consequently, it can do little to foment change 
within Latin American states. 
 The countermajoritarian nature of judicial review is inevitable. Both Bickel and Brown 
note, however, that review by an independent judiciary, whether or not you term it 
countermajoritarian, is the most effective means of ensuring conformity with a higher norm, thus 
protecting individual rights and encouraging rule of law.33 Poland’s Tribunal has successfully 
established a robust review after first demonstrating the absence of insalubrious effects on 
democratic rule by reviewing politically obsolete administrative actions. Although Chile is 
progressing, until a single court is vested with the power to exercise uncontested, erga omnes 
                                                 
32 See Adarsh Sein Anand, Protection of Human Rights Through Judicial Review in India, in 2 JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 381 (Mads Andenas ed., 2000). 
33 See BICKEL, supra note 8; Brown, supra note 8. 
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review over some portion of governmental action, be it administrative or legislative, courts will 
continue to beat the drums of judicial review while the country marches to a different beat.  
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